Results showed that dream recall at home was more likely to occur on mornings preceded by presleep mood ratings that were relatively negative and that this was particularly true for infrequent dream recallers. The results failed to support repression hypotheses of dream recall that derive from the "afterexpulsion" concept of Freud. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that presleep mood affects the salience (vividness, emotionality, etc.), and thus the recallability, of the dream experience. In addition, negative presleep mood was associated with more unpleasant dreams (characterized by threat, helplessness, and vulnerability), especially for subjects reporting lower overall self-confidence.
Psychologists have become increasingly interested in waking imagery, recalled dreams, and their possible relationship to personality and adaptation (Holt, 1964; Singer & Singer, 1972) . Recent investigations provide some empirical support for the following set of working assumptions that guided the present study: (a) Dreaming expresses and contributes to psychological adaptation (Breger, 1967; Dewan, 1969; Fisher, 1965; Fiss, 1969; Greenberg, Pillard, & Pearlman, 1972; Grieser, Greenberg, & Harrison, 1972; Krippner & Hughes, 1970; Witkin, 1969) ; (b) stress tends to increase the salience (vividness, emotionality, etc.) of dreams (Breger, Hunter, & Lane, 1971; Dewan, 1969; Witkin, 1969) ; and (c) barring postsleep interference with attention to the dream experience, more salient dreams are more likely to be recalled (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1973) . In the present study, the following sequence of internal events is hypothesized: Changes in level of psychological stress cause correlated changes in the salience of the dream experience which lead to correlated change in the recallability of the dream experience. Evidence that dream recall is facilitated by dysphoric presleep mood would support the hypothesis that the effect is mediated by heightened salience of the dreaming experience. On the basis of this line of thought, the following prediction was made: Prediction 1. Dream experiences will more likely be recalled on mornings following relatively low-self-confidence ratings than on mornings following relatively high-self-confidence presleep ratings.
Although little is known about the effect of night to night shifts in presleep mood on affect associated with dreams reported the next morning, the following prediction was made:
Prediction 2. Nights with relatively lowself-confidence presleep ratings will yield more unpleasant dreams than will nights with relatively high-self-confidence presleep ratings.
METHOD Subjects
The sample consisted of 67 college women who volunteered to fill out presleep mood rating and dream diary sheets for a period of five days toward the end of the fall semester of 1972.
Procedure
Subjects were asked to fill out an evening rating sheet before going to sleep and then to record on a diary sheet any dream content recalled immediately after waking the next morning. Subjects received a booklet consisting of five evening rating sheets each followed by a dream diary sheet. The rating sheet contained 12 bipolar, 7-point scales such as "depressed versus happy," "listless, didn't feel like doing anything" versus "full of energy," "felt confident of self" versus "felt unconfident of self." At the bottom of each sheet was enough space for the subject to indicate the basis of her ratings. Most subjects provided this additional information (e.g.,
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DAVID B. COHEN exams, roommates, boyfriends, etc.). On the dream diary sheet the subject could check whether there was no recall (dreamless report) or recall of having been dreaming without recall of details (contentless report). For the major analyses of this study, only content reports were considered "dream recall." Space was provided to describe recalled dream content. At the bottom of the sheet were five S-point scales on which the subject rated recalled dream material for vagueness versus vividness, realism (plausibility) versus bizarreness, emotional neutrality versus unpleasantness, emotional neutrality versus pleasantness, and dreamer as passive observer versus active participant. On both evening rating and diary sheets, subjects were asked to identify themselves by subject number rather than name (to facilitate honest self-disclosure).
Of direct relevance to this study are the following dimensions: the highest versus lowest self-confidence presleep ratings, the presence or absence of dream recall, and the net unpleasantness (unpleasantness minus pleasantness) ratings for each of five nights.
The recording period began on a Tuesday night of one week and extended to Tuesday morning of the following week. No recording was done on the weekend. Thus, although the record was kept for five days, the recording period spanned a two-week period.
At the beginning of the study each subject filled out an eight-step questionnaire for estimating dream recall frequency for the previous two weeks. Of the 67 subjects, 25 could be classified as frequent recallers (dream recall most mornings of the week or more), and 18 could be classified as infrequent recallers (recall once a week or less). The validity of the questionnaire has been discussed elsewhere (Cohen, 1973a) .
RESULTS
For each subject, mean percentage of dream recall associated with the lowest self-confidence rating was compared to mean percentage of dream recall associated with the highest self-confidence rating. A within-subjects comparison (Hayes, 1963, p. 335) of dream recall for the 67 subjects yielded a significant mean difference between highest selfconfidence (37%) and lowest self-confidence (55%) (t = 2.52, dj = 66, p< .01). For 27 of the 67 subjects the differences between highest and lowest self-confidence ratings was minimal (i.e., 1 or 2 scale points). If the mood invariant subjects are removed from the analysis, the respective comparison yields a more marked difference (t = 2.91, df = 39, p < .01). Mean percentage of dream recall (content reports) for the 40 mood varying subjects is shown in Table 1 . These results are consistent with the hypothesis that stress affects the salience and thus the recallability of the dream experience (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1973; Pivik & Foulkes, 1966) ; thus Prediction 1 is confirmed.
The role of individual differences in moderating the effect of presleep stress on dream recall has been explored in a number of investigations (Cohen, 1972; Cohen & Wolfe, 1973; Witkin, 1969) whose results are somewhat equivocal. The attempt to demonstrate that presleep stress inhibits dream reporting in subjects supposedly characterized by repression has not been successful. In order to pursue this question further, a subgroup of 25 frequent dream recallers (most days of the week) was compared to a subgroup of 18 infrequent recallers (less than once a week) with respect to the effect of presleep mood on dream reporting. For the frequent recallers, 55% of the lowest self confidence nights versus 54% of the highest self-confidence nights yielded dream reports. For the infrequent recallers, 64% of the lowest self-confidence nights versus 32% of the highest selfconfidence nights yielded dream reports (t = 2.15, df= 17, p< .05).
Because the frequent recallers were somewhat overrepresented by individuals with a range of less than 3 scale points between highest and lowest self-confidence ratings, a separate analysis was carried out to compare the differential effect of presleep selfconfidence on the two groups with the range of self-confidence ratings controlled. Out of a possible set of 12 frequent and 12 infrequent recallers with ranges of more than 2 scale points, 11 members of the infrequent recaller group could be paired with 11 members of the frequent recaller group such that each pair of subjects (one from each recaller group) was equivalent in range of self-confidence ratings. For the frequent recallers, highest self-confidence was associated with 41% dream recall versus 58% for lowest selfconfidence (t<l). For the infrequent recallers, highest self-confidence was associated with 36% dream recall versus 74% for lowest self-confidence (t = 1.99, dj = 10, p < .10). Thus with range of self-confidence controlled, the relative difference in dream recall responsiveness between the two groups is still observed.
These results seem inconsistent with those previously reported by Cohen (1972) . One major problem with that study, as well as others on which it was based (Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964; Witkin, 1969) , may lie with the presleep manipulation. It is entirely possible that stressful manipulations may affect postsleep concerns and motivation to record dream experiences. Postsleep concerns may interfere with the recall of dreams and cancel the effect of increased dream salience (Herman Witkin, personal communication, March 29, 1973) .
That negative presleep mood increases the probability of dream recall especially for infrequent recallers who are supposed to be repressers is inconsistent with the hypothesis that repression is an important determinant of dream recall. Neither repression-related traits nor repression-inducing presleep manipulations are associated with a reliable reduction of dream reporting (Cohen, 1974) . The failure to recall dreams is more parsimoniously explained in terms of the salience of the dream experience (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1973) , sleep stage from which a person awakens (Foulkes, 1966) , and freedom from postdream distractions that interfere with the retrieval of the memory trace (Cohen & Wolfe, 1973) . For a comprehensive review of the evidence for these alternative factors, see Cohen (1974) .
The data reported above are also inconsistent with the interesting variant of the repression hypothesis that has been offered by Witkin (1969) and Goodenough (1967) . They described two types of nonrecall of dreams: the report of having been dreaming but failure to recall specific content, that is, the "contentless report," and the report of total failure to recall any mental activity, that is, the "dreamless report." According to these investigators, the contentless, rather than the dreamless, report is a phenomenological representation of repression (Witkin, 1969, p. 32) . Thus it would be hypothesized that presleep stress should yield more contentless reports than control conditions. Some initial, but very weak, support for this hypothesis was reported by Cohen (1972) . However, in the light of more recent research (Cohen & Wolfe, 1973) it is likely that the contentless report has more to do with postsleep distractions or with decreased motivation than with repression. In fact, Witkin and Goodenough (Donald Goodenough, personal communication, May 6, 1972; Herman Witkin, personal communication, March 26, 1973) have recently, independent of the present writer, offered a similar explanation. Data from the study presented here are relevant to the hypothesis. According to the contentless-repression hypothesis, nights associated with lowest self-confidence should produce more contentless recall than nights with highest self-confidence. Changes in self-confidence should have little effect on the production of dreamless reports. Table 1 shows the percentage of contentless and dreamless reports for the 40 subjects whose highest and lowest confidence ratings were more than 2 scale points apart. The withinsubjects difference in mean percentage of dreamless reports for highest versus lowest self-confidence nights is not statistically significant. The difference in mean percentage of contentless reports approaches statistical significance (t = 1.99, df = 39, p < .06) and is in the direction opposite to that predicted by the repression hypothesis.
If affect associated with recalled dreams reflects presleep mood, then low self-confidence should be associated with relatively more unpleasant dreams (Prediction 2). Of the 67 subjects, 19 produced a dream report for both highest and lowest self-confidence nights. Of these 19, 10 had self-confidence ratings that differed more than 2 scale points.
Since college students' dreams tend to be more unpleasant than pleasant (Hall, 1966) , pleasantness ratings were subtracted from unpleasantness ratings to yield a net unpleasantness score. Thus the higher the score, the more unpleasant the dream. For the 10 subjects used in the analysis, lowest selfconfidence night yielded a mean net unpleasantness of 1.18 versus .10 for highest self-confidence night (t -2.01, df = 9, p< .10). While it may be argued that the 10 subjects who provided data for this comparison constitute a biased sample of the original 67, they are the logical choice to provide a reasonable comparison of high versus low selfconfidence effects. It is therefore concluded that shifts in presleep mood do influence the affective quality of the dream experience in a manner consistent with prediction and common sense.
However, the results suggest that the effect of presleep mood on dream affect is not particularly striking. Perhaps some individuals can mobilize good defensive capacities during dreaming sleep. The dream affect of these individuals would therefore not be as dependent on presleep mood as the dream affect of others. An independent measure of defensive competence for each subject was not obtained in this study. However, if it is assumed that five-day self-confidence ratings provide a crude measure of defensive competence, then subjects above the five-day median may be compared to subjects below the five-day median with respect to dream affect associated with equivalent, low self-confidence ratings for a particular night. A set of 14 "competent" and a set of 14 "incompetent" subjects were obtained by searching the sample of 67 subjects who could be matched on the basis of an equivalent and low selfconfidence rating for a single night and who produced a dream with affect ratings the next morning. The competent (five-day ratings above the median) and incompetent (five-day ratings below the median) subjects tended to overlap around 3 or 4 on the self-confidence rating dimension; the subjects were matched in terms of these numbers. Thus, the incompetent group dream affect scores tended to come from nights with ratings somewhat less extreme than were characteristic for this group. Such a bias in sampling works against the hypothesis, however. For the competent group, mean net unpleasantness for low selfconfidence was -.21 versus 2.34 for the incompetent group (t = 3.47, df = 26, p < .002). This post hoc analysis supports the hypothesis that the effect of presleep mood on dream affect (Prediction 2) depends on the capacity of the dreaming process to deal effectively with presleep disturbances. Thus the predicted relationship between presleep mood and dream affect (Prediction 2) appears to be moderated by theory-relevant personality characteristics that presumably continue during the dreaming (adaptive) process.
A superficial content analysis of the dreams of these subjects provides further evidence that defensively competent individuals work through presleep mood by mastering situations in dreams in an instrumental fashion. If one defines competent instrumental behavior in terms of effective problem solving or environmental control rather than flight from danger, then the competent group produced 9 such dreams out of 13 (one subject's content was too vague for scoring) versus only 5 out of 14 for the incompetent group. A comparison of proportions (Bruning & Kintz, 1968, p. 199) of dreams with competent instrumental behavior yielded a significant difference between the two groups (t = 2.62, df = 25, p < .02). Typical themes for the competent group were shopping, singing, playing, repairing, studying, giving a party, jumping into a car and driving, and traveling. Typical themes for the incompetent group were looking into a mirror, searching, smuggling, watching a funeral, lying down and being attacked, trying to revive a suicide, and feeling the imminence of death. While there was overlap in activity, the thematic and mood quality of the dreams of the incompetent group were clearly more negative, threatening, discouraging, and indicative of vulnerability and helplessness. It should be recalled that these differences obtain for two groups matched for presleep mood rating, despite the fact that, on the average, the incompetent group dreams came from nights with presleep mood relatively less negative than the worst mood ratings typical of this group. It would appear that affect and content of dreams are "symptomatic" of presleep mood, especially for individuals who are generally low on defensive competence, "ego strength," self-confidence, etc. This conclusion is consonant with the larger hypothesis that there is a significant amount of continuity of personality or life style within the dream (Bonime, 1962; Cohen, 1973b; DeMartino, 1959; Hall, 1966; Hall & Nordby, 1972) .
DISCUSSION
Situational changes in dream recall appear to be affected by presleep mood. Specifically, morning recall of dreaming is facilitated by presleep conditions characterized by relatively lower levels of self-confidence. Self-confidence, along with affect and self-consciousness, are important components of mood. It is assumed that the functional relationship between presleep mood and dream reporting is partially mediated by changes in the quality of the dreaming experience. In the light of data reported here, a tentative theory of the relationship between changes in presleep mood and dream recall can be formulated. Inadequacy or unavailability of instrumental coping behaviors (what Klinger, 1971, p. 48 , calls "operant despair") tends to induce negative affect (depressiveness, irritability, listlessness), heightened self-awareness, lower self-confidence, and to intensify the fantasy (visual and nonvisual) process (Fenichel, 1945; Gordon, 1972; Klinger, 1971; Lazarus & Opton, 1966; Handler & Watson, 1966; Sheehan, 1972) . In the absence either of salutory changes in the environment or mobilization of successful coping behavior, these psychological activities continue in sleep. During this state, they are represented by salient and unpleasant visual symbolism. But what about the link between presleep and dreaming states? If mood and fantasy are determined primarily by perceptual input and behavioral output not available during sleep and if sleep is taken to be an essentially passive state, then the presleep condition simply reverberates during sleep. The dream, like waking fantasy, would be seen as an epiphenomenological correlate of the continuing underlying psychological state that cannot be significantly altered until the following waking period. However, there is evidence that sleep is not a psychologically passive state and that at least the rapid eye movement period plays an active role in emotional adaptation (Greenberg et al., 1972; Grieser et al., 1972) .
With respect to dream recall, the more intense the "dreamwork" the more salient, and therefore the more recallable, the dream. It is possible that the degree to which an individual relies more heavily on this dreaming function, the more likely he is differentially responsive in terms of dream recall for a given shift toward more negative presleep mood. However, there is little experimental evidence for such an assumption.
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Prevailing hypotheses about the repression of dreams (Goodenough, 1967; Schonbar, 1959 Schonbar, , 1965 Wallach, 1963; Witkin, 1969) typically reflect only one of two repressive processes postulated by Freud (1965) , namely, the concept of afterexpulsion of dream imagery by the waking ego.
We must conclude that during the night the resistance loses some of its power . . . and that this makes the formation of dreams possible . . . having regained its full strength at the moment of waking, it at once precedes to get rid of what it was obliged to permit while it was weak [Freud, 1965, p. 526 ].
Attempts to demonstrate experimentally the occurrence of afterexpulsion of dreams have been generally unimpressive (Cohen, 1974) . The results of the present experiment are inconsistent with the afterexpulsion hypothesis. It may be concluded that the afterexpulsion of dreams experienced immediately on awkening in the laboratory or at home is at most an infrequent event. The evidence for such a conclusion, however, can not be constituted as an argument against the hypothe-50 DAVID B. COHEN sis that afterexpulsion of internal events plays a more important role in other areas of psychological functioning.
To date, there is no experimental work on the hypothesis that repression takes place via on line censorship (neutralization or disguise of noxious dream thoughts via dreamwork). Hall and Nordby (1972) provided anecdotal evidence of such a process in an example of a man who, in 1,400 recorded dreams, never overtly dreamed about his father. Apparent father symbolism suggested the hypothesis that some painful event had caused a massive repression of father reference in the dreams. It turned out that the man had been forced to perform sexual acts with his father at an early age (Hall & Nordby, 1972, pp. 22-23) . However, elsewhere Hall (1966) has shown that what appears disguised in one dream is directly dreamed about in another. This suggests that the dreamwork represents important ideas in different (not disguised) symbolic language (Hall, 1953; Piaget, 1962, pp. 194, 211) . In any case, there is nothing in the on line censorship hypothesis that demands that disguised ideas necessarily be less recallable. They may be visually intense, emotionally charged, and have other characteristics that make them more rather than less recallable.
In short, there is no experimental evidence for the afterexpulsion hypothesis of dream recall and for serious doubt about the relevance of censorship during sleep for a theory of dream recall. On the other hand, the dream salience hypothesis is unambiguous with respect to prediction of dream recall and, in the light of supportive evidence, must be considered an important contributing factor. It should be noted, however, that the effect of presleep mood on dream recall can account only for that part of the variance not affected by factors such as stage of sleep (Foulkes, 1966) and postsleep attention and motivation (Cohen & Wolfe, 1973 ) that may be relatively independent of presleep conditions.
